Peace with India in 2024?

By Imtiaz Hussain Abro.

Peace with India in 2024?

Two countries engaged in diplomatic and economic negotiations may have had a positive trajectory. 

On December 22 in the Poonch district of Indian-Occupied Kashmir, three individuals – Mohammad Showkat (22 years old), Safeer Hussain (45 years old), and Shabir Ahmad (32 years old) – were apprehended in the morning and later found dead. These casualties contribute to the tragic toll of over 100,000 Kashmiris who have lost their lives at the hands of India’s occupying forces over the past three and a half decades.

In less than six weeks, Pakistan is poised to elect a new government. It appears likely that this government may choose to downplay the Kashmir issue and prioritize ‘dialogue’ with India, potentially placing it above other critical matters, including economic concerns. As someone who has long advocated for normalization between South Asia’s two largest countries, one might expect me to welcome this prospect. However, a sense of unease prevails.

Exactly eight years ago on December 25, 2015, I was among the few Pakistanis excited about Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lahore. At that time, it symbolized an opportunity for both countries to engage as sovereign equals. India was grappling with the implications of having a right-wing Hindu supremacist leader at its helm, while Pakistan was successfully combating terrorism and witnessing economic growth.

Envisioning a positive trajectory for diplomatic and economic negotiations between the two nations was not difficult. Although the specifics remain unknown, there was potential for a different course of events. The optimism, however, proved short-lived, particularly after 2016.

The overt and unapologetic posture of India’s leaders since 2016 cannot be ignored. Amid Pakistan holding India responsible for financing and supporting terrorists attacking Pakistan, there have been escalating ceasefire violations across the Line of Control (LOC). India’s leaders have consistently sought to raise tensions, from claiming ‘surgical strikes’ in Pakistani territory to provocative statements about Balochistan, Gilgit, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

India’s conduct at international forums, such as supporting Pakistan’s grey-listing at the FATF and unilaterally altering the status quo in Kashmir in 2019, further underscores a more aggressive policy. India’s actions have undermined efforts to revive Saarc, and it has actively worked against any platform where it shares space with Pakistan, often creating confrontational situations in international forums.

In this context, the argument for Pakistan to make concessions to India seems weak. Proponents of further concessions may cite India’s economic growth, but is an economic gap a compelling reason to appease a belligerent adversary? More critically, can we identify the upper limit of what it would take to assuage the entrenched hostility of India’s Hindu supremacists?

While hoping for a dignified peace in South Asia in 2024, it is essential to avoid a rushed surrender and carefully consider the prevailing geopolitical realities.